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This paper investigates the extent to which exam performance at the end of 
compulsory education has been affected by three major education reforms: the 
introduction of a quasi-market following the Education Reform Act (1988); the 
specialist schools initiative introduced in 1994; and the Excellence in Cities 
programme introduced in 1999. We use data for all state-funded secondary schools in 
England over the period 1992-2006. The empirical analysis, which is based on the 
application of panel data methods, indicates that the government and its agencies have 
substantially overestimated the benefits flowing from these three major reforms. Only 
about one-third of the improvement in GCSE exam scores during 1992-2006 is 
directly attributable to the combined effect of the education reforms. The 
distributional consequences of the policy, however, are estimated to have been 
favourable, with the greatest gains being achieved by schools with the highest 
proportion of pupils from poor families. But there is evidence that resources have not 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
 
Over recent decades, and in countries as diverse as Australia, Chile, India, New 
Zealand, Sweden, the US and the UK, governments have decentralised the provision 
of compulsory education in the hope of stimulating improvements in the educational 
attainment of pupils (Fiske, 1996). The debate about the most appropriate method of 
providing education has a long history (Friedman, 1962) and has spurred a growing 
body of theoretical analyses (Bearse, Glomm and Ravikumar, 2000; Fernandez and 
Rogerson 1999; Hoxby, 1998, 1999; Nechyba, 2000; De Fraya, Oliveira and Zanchi, 
2006). In addition, a large number of empirical analyses have been undertaken, 
particularly in the USA. In both the theoretical and empirical literature, the critical 
issue is the trade-off between efficiency and equity. Those who oppose a 
decentralised approach to education provision argue that it will lead to an increase in 
socio-economic segregation and ultimately greater income inequality (Levin, 1991a, 
1991b). It is also argued that the wider social benefits generated by education - such 
as citizenship, a deeper sense of community and knowledge spillovers - can only be 
internalised through centralised provision. In contrast, proponents of a decentralised 
system argue that decentralisation is more likely to lead to an increase in allocative 
and productive efficiency (Hoxby, 1996). 
  In the UK, this reform agenda has manifested itself in a series of education 
reforms, beginning with the Educational Reform Act of 1988, which sought to 
stimulate the creation of a quasi-market in secondary education. At the heart of these 
reforms were measures to increase parental choice and increase competition between 
schools for pupils. These reforms have been bolstered by the Specialist Schools 
Programme, which aimed to increase the diversity of secondary education provision, 
thereby enhancing parental choice. In addition, the Labour Government recently 
introduced the Excellence in Cities Initiative (EiC), which sought to improve the 
educational performance of pupils in schools located in the most disadvantaged 
metropolitan areas. The key distinguishing feature of this policy initiative was to 
stimulate cooperation between schools, in the context of partnership agreements, by 
sharing good practice.   Several previous papers have investigated the effects of the quasi-market in 
secondary education in England on educational outcomes, school efficiency and 
equality of educational opportunity (Bradley and Taylor, 2002, 2004; Bradley, Johnes 
and Millington, 2004). More recently, Taylor (2007) has analysed the impact of the 
specialist schools initiative on examination outcomes. In the present paper, we draw 
these previous strands of our research together to measure the impact of the trinity of 
education reforms on the change in exam performance in secondary schools over the 
period 1992-2006. Our focus is on the proportion of pupils who obtain five or more 
‘good’ grades in the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) exams, 
which are taken by all pupils in England at age 16.1 The proportion of pupils in 
England obtaining ‘good’ exam grades has risen from 35.5% in 1992 to 58.3% in 
2006, a dramatic improvement. Our aim is to answer three questions: First, what 
fraction of this improvement in exam performance can be attributed to the education 
reforms identified above? Second, which, if any, of the three major education reforms 
have had the greatest effect in raising exam performance in secondary schools? Third, 
have the reforms had any distributional consequences? For, instance, how do the 
effects of the education reforms vary by pupil background, such as ability, family 
income and ethnicity?   
  To answer these questions we use a panel of schools covering the period 1992-
2006, which has the advantage that we can take a medium-term view of the effect of 
the quasi-market reforms and the specialist schools initiative. Moreover, by 
incorporating the EiC initiative into our analysis, we are able to get a better feel for 
the relative importance of each policy reform. From a technical point of view, using a 
panel of schools allows us to control for school level unobserved heterogeneity and so 
minimise the bias caused by endogeneous school choice.  
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, we briefly describe 
the education reforms that have led to the creation of the quasi-market in secondary 
education, the specialist schools initiative and the EiC programme. A brief review of 
previous empirical studies is also provided. Section III introduces the data, identifies 
                                                 
1 The GCSE exam is taken in approximately 8 to 10 subjects by pupils aged 15-16. Pupils undertake 
coursework and exams in most subjects and a ‘good’ grade is one in the range A*-C. The Government 
uses the proportion of pupils obtaining 5 or more A*-C grades in the GCSE exams as the benchmark 
for school success. The GCSE is a standard, norm-based, examination taken by almost all pupils, and 
the eight pass grades range from A* to G.  Grades A* to C are considered acceptable for entry to 
university, together with passes in more advanced examinations (A and AS levels) two years later.    
 the determinants of school performance and presents our econometric methodology. 
Section IV discusses the results of a statistical analysis of changes in school 
performance over the period 1992-2006. Section V concludes. 
 
II CHOICE  AND  COMPETITION  IN SECONDARY EDUCATION 
 
The introduction of a quasi-market in secondary education in England 
Over the last twenty years, the provision of education in Britain has been radically 
transformed by a series of reforms, many of which stem from the Education Reform 
Act (1988). These reforms have led to the creation of a quasi-market in secondary 
education (Le Grand, 1991, 1993; Glennerster, 1991).2 As a result, a centralised-state 
model of educational provision has been replaced by a more decentralised approach. 
The salient institutional features of the quasi-market in England’s schools have been 
described in detail elsewhere (Bradley, Crouchley, Millington and Taylor 1998). The 
two main tenets of the decentralised approach are greater parental choice over the 
school attended by their child and an increase in competition between schools for 
pupils. Parents may be expected to take a school’s exam performance into account, 
amongst other factors, in deciding on an appropriate school for their child, thus 
increasing allocative efficiency through greater choice.3  
  Schools have an incentive to recruit pupils because funding is linked directly 
to pupil numbers, and allowing schools to determine their own allocation of funding 
was expected to result in greater productive efficiency.4 By allowing schools to 
compete for pupils, it was expected that educational performance would rise. 
Successful schools would thrive while unsuccessful schools would either close or 
decline in size, or improve their own performance in response to competition. It is 
expected that schools are most likely to respond positively to competition from rival 
schools in the local quasi-market. Similarly, the greater the amount of choice 
                                                 
2 Glennerster (1991) explains why the quasi-market is not a full market solution. 
3 Data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) indicate that choice of 
secondary school is influenced primarily by family and friends (66%), a school’s location (63%) and a 
school’s exam performance (38%). Other less important factors are religious considerations (8%) and 
other characteristics of the school (7%). It is worth noting that 86% of parents indicated that their child 
went to their first-choice school.  
4 Information about each school’s exam performance is provided by the annual publication of the 
School Performance Tables. available to parents in an educational marketplace, the stronger the effect of 
competition should be. 
  The sorting of pupils between schools and cream-skimming by ‘good’ schools 
could, however, have distributional consequences. Pupils from poorer families may 
increasingly become concentrated in the ‘poor’ (i.e. worst performing) schools 
whereas pupils from wealthier families become increasingly concentrated in the 
‘good’ schools (i.e. best performing). Cream skimming by schools reinforces this 
process of segregation, insofar as schools which face an excess demand for places will 
‘select’ those pupils with the best chance of being successful in national exams, 
thereby making the school more popular with potential entrants. In contrast, failing 
schools have little option but to accept less able pupils.  
  For the US, there is a growing body of evidence that examines the effect of 
competition between state-funded schools (Borland and Howsen, 1992) and 
competition between school districts (Blair and Staley, 1995; Marlow, 1997, 2000; 
Zanzig, 1997) on school performance. Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2006) review this 
evidence and conclude that it is at best ‘mixed’. Furthermore, there is still very little 
empirical evidence for the UK (Levacic and Hardman, 1998). Bradley et al (1998) 
tested to see if a quasi-market in the secondary education sector had been created, 
whereas Bradley, Johnes and Millington (2001) investigated the determinants of 
school efficiency. Both studies showed that the greater the competition among 
schools, the larger the improvement in exam performance and efficiency. Moreover, 
‘good’ schools grew more rapidly and expanded their pupil capacity to accommodate 
the excess demand for places. However, both studies focused on a fairly brief time 
period (1992-98), and it is possible that the quasi-market has become more effective 
as schools have adapted their behaviour.  
  More recently, Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2006) have analysed the effect of 
choice and competition in the primary school sector within a 45km radius of Central 
London using pupil level data from the National Pupil Database. Choice and 
competition are measured by the number of schools in a district and the average 
distance between home and schools in the district. They find little evidence that 
choice and competition improve exam performance amongst English primary schools. 
Church schools do respond positively to competition, however, especially where their 
competitors are also church schools in more competitive markets. Moreover, the benefits 
of this competition are highest for pupils in church schools with a greater proportion of children from low-income families. The authors conclude that the effects of choice and 
competition in raising exam performance of pupils in the primary school sector have not 
been substantial or widespread.  These results also imply that choice and competition only 
have beneficial effects where there is heterogeneity amongst primary schools, in this case 
in terms of their religious background.  
 
The specialist schools programme – increasing diversity and choice 
The second major education reform in the secondary school sector in England since 
the early 1990s has been the implementation of the specialist schools programme. 
Specialist schools are state-maintained secondary schools with a designated subject 
specialism. Schools have an incentive to acquire specialist status because they receive 
a capital grant of £100,000 and extra funding per pupil for four subsequent years. The 
policy began with the designation of technology colleges in 1994. The Government’s 
aim is that all secondary schools in England will ultimately have specialist status 
(Levavic and Jenkins 2004), the intention being to improve exam performance 
through greater subject specialisation and greater choice. Moreover, since 2004, 
schools have been allowed to have two specialisms in any combination of subjects.5 
  There is contrasting evidence on the success of the specialist schools 
programme. Evidence in support of a positive effect of specialist schools on exam 
performance is provided by Gorard (2002), Jesson (2002), Jesson and Crossley (2004) 
and OFSTED (2005). This has led the Government to argue that the programme has 
been extremely successful. This view has been challenged by the Education and Skills 
Committee of the House of Commons (House of Commons, 2003, p.4). Furthermore, 
Schagen and Goldstein (2002) have highlighted the methodological weaknesses of 
analyses that do not use multi-level modelling techniques, such as those cited above, 
and are especially critical of the school level analyses conducted by the Specialist 
Schools Trust. Taylor (2007) argues that all previous work suffers from a serious 
weakness: no attempt has been made to investigate whether the switch to specialist 
status has been associated with a subsequent change in a school’s performance.   
 
Excellence in cities (EiC) 
                                                 
5 In 2006/7, 10% of all maintained secondary schools had two specialisms.  See the Standards Site at 
the Department of Children, Schools and Families (standards.dfes.gov.uk/specialistschools).  The EiC is a major government policy which aimed to raise the standard of education 
for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds in urban schools. The policy was 
launched in 1999 and was targeted at all secondary schools in 25 local education 
authorities in the major cities of England. The programme was extended in 2000 
(phase 2) and again in 2001 (phase 3), covering approximately one third of all 
secondary schools which have been organised into 57 partnerships (CITE).6 The EiC 
aimed to diversify provision in secondary schools so that the needs of all pupils 
(‘gifted and talented’ as well as ‘disadvantaged’) were met in the context of 
cooperation between schools, organised through partnerships.7  The objectives of the 
programme were to improve educational performance by raising the motivation and 
expectations of pupils, improving the quality of teaching and changing the ethos of 
schools through partnerships.8  
  A DfES funded evaluation of the EiC, based on both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, concludes that the programme created a positive ethos towards 
learning in the recipient schools, resulting in improved pupil motivation and 
behaviour, and also better attendance (Kendall et al., 2005). These changes are 
regarded as important for subsequent improvements in exam performance. Kendall et 
al. show that there was an almost immediate impact of the EiC programme but this 
was confined to attainment in maths at the end of Key Stage 3 for pupils in the most 
disadvantaged schools. In a quantitative analysis, Machin, McNally and Meghir 
(2004) estimate that the short-run impact of the EiC programme was to increase the 
proportion of pupils moving up one grade by 3%, though much weaker effects were 
found for English than for maths. Insofar as the positive effects of the EiC programme 
disseminate throughout the school over time, we might expect an improvement in the 
GCSE performance of pupils in participating schools. This effect should be stronger 
for phase 1 schools because there has been more time for good practice to 
disseminate.  
 
                                                 
6 Expenditure on the EiC programme rose from £24 million in 1999/2000 to £139 million in 2000/2001 
and then to £386 million in 2005/2006. This represented approximately 4.3% of total local authority 
current expenditure on secondary schools, which was £9,000 million in 2000/2001. Total funding 
during 1999-2006 has been around £1.7bn and the funding per pupil has been around £140 per pupil. 
7 Specifically, the EiC established learning mentors, to provide support for students with educational 
and/or behavioural difficulties; learning support units, to provide short-term support for ‘difficult’ 
pupils; and the gifted and talented programme. The latter focused on the most able 5-10% of pupils.  
8 See Excellence in Cities: The National Evaluation of a Policy to Raise Standards in Urban Schools 
2000-2003 by Kendall et al. (2005) for a fuller discussion of the EiC programme. III.        DATA AND METHODS 
 
The data 
The two main data sources used in the present study are the School Performance 
Tables, published annually by the DCSF (formerly DfES) and the unpublished annual 
Schools’ Census. The School Performance Tables contain, amongst other things, 
information about the exam performance of pupils (at school level) in all maintained 
secondary schools in England. The Schools’ Census provides information on, for 
example, admissions policy, gender mix, the number of teaching staff and support 
staff, the pupil-teacher ratio, and the proportion of pupils eligible for free school 
meals. Data from these two data sets are available from 1992 through 2006. 
Additional information about specialist schools and schools involved in the EiC 
programme was obtained from the DCSF. Table 1 shows the mean value of some of 
these variables over the study period and Table 2 shows the number of schools in each 
specialism in 2006.   
  As suggested earlier, school performance is measured by the proportion of 
pupils obtaining five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C, which are defined as ‘good’ 
exam grades.9 As suggested above, this measure provides schools, parents and the 
government with a simple and readily understandable measure of the exam 
performance of each school. Table 1 shows that there has been a sustained increase in 
the proportion of pupils obtaining good exam grades.  There has, however, been some 
variation in this measure of exam performance. For instance, Figures 1 and 2 show 
how exam performance varies between specialist and non-specialist schools and 
between schools located in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. It is clear from 
Figure 1 that specialist schools have out-performed non-specialist schools throughout 
the period. The gap, however, began to widen after 2001, doubling from around 7 
percentage points to 14 percentage points by 2005. In contrast, the gap in exam 
performance between schools in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas has 
narrowed substantially over time, indicating a steady catching-up process in operation 
throughout the period. This catching-up process has been especially strong during 
2004/6 (see Figure 2), possibly as a consequence of the EiC programme.     
                                                 
9 The correlation between the proportion of pupils obtaining 5 or more GCSEs at grades A* to C and 
exam performance measured by the average number of points obtained per pupil (first made available 
in 1999) is 0.97.  
Econometric methodology 
Following Hanushek (1979, 1986) we estimate an education production function, 
which in its simplest form can be written as follows: 
 
Yst = f(PUPst, FAMst, NEIGHst, SCHst) + errorst       (1) 
 
where Y refers to an educational outcome (e.g. exam results) of school s at time t, 
PUP indexes observed pupil characteristics, such as gender, FAM refers to family 
background variables, NEIGH indicates neighbourhood influences and SCH 
represents a set of school inputs, such as the pupil-teacher ratio.  Given our focus on 
the effects of education policy on educational outcomes, Equation 1 can be extended 
to include policy variables:   
 
Yst = f(PUPst, FAMst, NEIGHst, SCHst, COMPst-1, SPECst, EiCst) + errorst  (2) 
 
Three policies are identified in this analysis: first, the competition for pupils between 
schools, COMP, due to the introduction of quasi-market forces; second, the specialist 
schools programme, SPEC; and third, the extra funding provided for schools in urban 
locations in the form of the Excellence in Cities programme, EiC. The competition 
variable is measured by the average exam performance of all schools in the local 
authority district, lagged one year, excluding the school in question.10 As suggested 
above, it is expected that the change in a school’s exam performance will be 
positively related to the exam performance of competitor schools in the same district. 
Failure to improve exam performance when other schools in the district are improving 
theirs would imply falling pupil numbers and hence a decrease in funding.  
The potential impact of competition for pupils on a school’s exam 
performance can also be investigated in other ways. First, an important feature of the 
quasi-market is parental choice of school. We address this by stratifying our data 
according to the number of schools in a district, which allows us to examine the effect 
of competition between schools, holding the level of parental choice constant. Second, 
we construct a measure of concentration to examine the effect of competition holding 
                                                 
 the degree of concentration constant. The Herfindahl index is used to measure the 
degree to which pupils obtaining ‘good’ exam results are concentrated in schools 
within each district.11 
SPEC is a dummy variable which is unity for those years during which a 
school has specialist status and zero otherwise; and similarly for the EiC programme. 
Therefore, for both SPEC and EiC we observe when the policy was ‘’switched on’. 
As suggested earlier, the existence of specialist schools adds to the diversity of 
educational provision in a district and hence allows pupils to choose schools that 
better match their preferences and aptitudes. To the extent that this choice improves 
allocative efficiency, we expect SPEC to have a positive effect on educational 
outcomes. However, there may be variation in exam performance between schools 
with respect to the subject in which they choose to specialise. This could occur, for 
example, if there are variations between subjects in the availability of suitably 
qualified teachers, such as in science and maths, or perhaps because the extra funding 
has a greater impact per student in some subjects than in others. Ten subject 
specialisms are identified in our statistical analysis (see Table 2).  
As suggested earlier, the extra funding provided under the EiC programme 
was also made available to schools in an attempt to improve diversity of secondary 
education for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds in urban areas. The funding was 
provided to stimulate cooperation between schools so that best practice could be 
diffused and the exam performance of ‘poor’ schools improved. It is therefore 
expected that EiC will have a positive effect on the exam performance of schools, and 
these effects will be larger the longer the school has been receiving such funding.  
  Estimation of equation (2) using OLS will, however, produce biased results 
arising from the endogeneity of certain variables and the existence of unobserved 
heterogeneity (Mayston, 2007; De Fraya, Oliveira and Zanchi, 2006). The error term 
in Equation (2) will include the effects of unmeasured features of both the school (e.g. 
teacher quality and school ethos) and the pupil (e.g. motivation and innate ability). 
                                                 
11 A two-year lag was also tried but the results did not differ substantively from using 
a one-year lag. 
11 The Herfindahl index is the sum over all schools in a district of (si - Si)
2, where s is the 
proportion of pupils obtaining five or more A*-C grades in each school and S is the district 
mean.  
 
  These unobserved variables are likely to be correlated with observed covariates, and 
in particular with SPEC and EiC. Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity is therefore 
likely to generate an upward bias in both of these covariates. There is also likely to be 
a correlation between some of the family background and school covariates. For 
instance, schools with a high proportion of pupils from ‘favourable’ family 
backgrounds (e.g. parents with a keen interest in their child’s education) are likely to 
find it easier to recruit ‘good’ teachers, leading to better educational performance. If 
schools with good exam results attract ‘good’ teachers, some of the school covariates 
will be endogenous. Ignoring these problems may lead to a serious downward bias on 
school quality variables, such as the pupil / teacher ratio (Mayston, 2007).   
  An alternative estimation strategy that may reduce these biases is to exploit the 
panel nature of our data and estimate a fixed effects model, as follows: 
 
  st st st st s st EiC SPEC COMP Y ε δ η λ α + + + + + + = − µ T β X t st 1    (3) 
 
The vector T refers to a set of time dummies and Xst is a vector of time varying 
family, neighbourhood and school covariates. The  s α  refer to school level fixed 
effects, which capture the effect of unobserved, time-invariant, school and pupil 
variables referred to earlier. The  s α  also include time-constant family, neighbourhood 
and school variables, and the correlations between them.12 Thus, the fixed effects 
model provides more precise estimates insofar as the policy variables explain 
differences between schools in the within school variation in Ys over time.  
 
IV.        RESULTS 
 
This section reports the estimated impact of the education reforms on exam 
performance. We first estimate the individual effect of the three education reforms. 
This is followed by estimates of the distributional consequences of the reforms. We 
do this by sub-dividing schools into groups according to pupil achievement, the 
proportion eligible for free school meals, the proportion from ethnic minorities and 
                                                 
12 The results change very little when we estimate a random effects model (which assumes 
independence between the observed covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity) to check the 
robustness of our results.  the gender of a school’s pupils. Finally, we investigate whether the reforms have had 
differential effects according to school choice (measured by the number of schools in 
each district) and also according to the potential competition between schools (as 
measured by the concentration of exam ‘successes’ within each school district).  
 
The effect of the education reforms on exam performance 
In order to investigate the overall impact of the education reforms, we begin by 
regressing exam performance on a set of year dummies in Model 1 (Table 3). This 
shows that the mean exam performance of all schools increased by 19 percentage 
points between 1993 and 2006. This serves as a benchmark for estimating the impact 
of the full range of variables specified in the previous section (see Eq. 3 above).  
All of the specified variables are included in Model 2. The non-policy 
variables with significant coefficients are the pupil / teacher ratio, school size (as 
indicated by the number of pupils in the school) and the proportion of pupils eligible 
for free school meals (both within the school and within the local authority district). 
The pupil / teacher ratio and the proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals are 
both negatively related to exam performance as expected. As in previous studies 
(Bradley and Taylor 1998), school size is found to be positively related to exam 
performance.   
The three policy variables are all positively related to exam performance and 
are highly statistically significant. The estimated coefficients suggest that a one 
percentage point increase in the exam performance of other schools in the same 
district is associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the school’s own exam 
performance. The coefficient on the EiC variable indicates that the programme has 
been associated with a 2.1 percentage point improvement in the exam performance of 
those schools participating in the programme. The estimated impact of the specialist 
schools programme, however, appears to have been quite small, with the acquisition 
of specialist status being associated with an improvement in exam performance of less 
than 1 percentage point. The overall impact of all of the explanatory variables on 
exam performance is indicated by the reduction in the estimated coefficient on the 
year dummy for 2006, which falls from 19 to 11 percentage points (comparing 
Models 1 and 2).  
Our regression results suggest that competition between schools was 
associated with an improvement of around 4 percentage points in the overall exam score during 1993-2006.13 Adding the impact of the EiC and specialist schools 
programmes, we estimate that the education reforms improved exam performance by 
around 6 percentage points in total. The regression results also indicate that the 
increase in school size of around 200 pupils per school during the period was 
associated with a two percentage point improvement in exam results. This leaves an 
improvement of 11 percentage points in exam performance unaccounted for. Model 2 
therefore indicates that around one-third of the improvement in exam results during 
1993-2006 can be directly attributed to the three major education reforms.  
The impact of two of the policy variables is investigated in more detail in 
Model 3. The EiC programme was phased in over three years and hence those in the 
first phase have received extra funding for longer. Those schools included in the 
earlier phasing are expected to have experienced the greatest improvement in 
performance. This is exactly what we observe. On average, schools included in phase 
1 (in the 1999/2000 school year) witnessed a 2.1 percentage point improvement in 
exam performance, whereas those schools in phase 3 (in year 2002 and beyond) 
exhibit a 1.6 percentage point improvement. The specialist schools programme can 
similarly be split into different specialisms in order to estimate the impact for each 
type of specialist school. When this is done, we find that the specialist schools 
programme is significantly positively related to exam performance for only three of 
the ten specialisms (which accounted for 40% of all specialist schools in 2006). The 
impact on exam performance for schools specialising in arts, technology and business 
studies is estimated to be 1.0, 1.6 and 2.3 percentage points respectively.  
 
The distributional effects of the education reforms 
In this section we analyse whether the education reforms have benefited some groups 
of pupils more than others. Specifically, we test for the effect of the reforms according 
to ability, parental income, ethnicity and gender. 
To investigate the differential impact of the reforms on different ability 
groups, we sub-divide schools into quintiles according to the mean value of ‘exam 
successes’ over the study period. Equation 3 is then estimated for each group 
separately. Table 4 shows the results for each of the policy variables for different 
                                                 
13 This estimate is obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficient on the lagged exam performance 
of all other schools in the district (0.21) by the change in the exam performance of all other schools in 
the district over the period 1992-2005 (20 percentage points). ability groups. For almost all ability groups the policy variables are positive and 
statistically significant. The estimated impact of each policy, however, varies across 
the five ability groups. For example, the effect of competition between schools is 
stronger at the bottom end of the ability distribution than at the top, which could 
reflect the fact that schools with lower exam performance have simply had to improve 
their exam performance in order to maintain their position in the local market for 
pupils. It should be noted, however, that there is less scope for schools at the top end 
of the ability range to improve their exam performance (because the dependent 
variable is censored at 100%).14  
Interestingly, the effect of the EiC programme is weakest at the bottom end of 
the ability range, probably because schools with a high proportion of the least able 
pupils are from very disadvantaged backgrounds and the extra funding provided by 
the policy is insufficient to compensate for this. The greater success of the policy for 
higher ability groups also implies that the programme has been directed at the most 
able pupils even in areas of severe deprivation. The opposite result is found for the 
specialist schools programme, which had its greatest impact at the bottom end of the 
ability range. Specialist schools with the lowest exam scores have witnessed a 1.6 
percentage point improvement over the period 1993-2005, compared to an estimated 
effect not significantly different from zero in the top two quintiles of the ability range.   
  The estimated policy effects over the family income range are reported in 
Table 5. Equation 3 is estimated separately for each quintile of the proportion of 
pupils eligible for free school meals, which is highly correlated with the 
corresponding distribution in family income levels. The clearest result is the 
difference in policy effects between pupils from the poorest and richest family 
backgrounds. Schools with the highest proportion of pupils from poor families have 
benefited the most from the three education reforms, whereas schools with the lowest 
proportion have not benefited at all. The specialist schools programme, for example, 
is associated with an improvement in exam performance of 2.8 percentage points for 
schools with a high proportion of pupils from poor families compared to no effect for 
schools with a low proportion of pupils from poor families. Taking all three policy 
instruments together, we estimate that the policy reforms raised exam performance by 
                                                 
14 When we estimate a fixed effects tobit model (with an upper limit of 80%) to allow for the possible 
effects of censoring, our findings remain substantively unchanged. 
 8.8 percentage points for those schools with the highest proportion of pupils from 
poor families compared to no measurable effect for schools with the lowest proportion 
of pupils from poor families. 
  Although the impact of the specialist schools programme is estimated to have 
been small overall, there is evidence that some types of specialist school benefited 
substantially, but only those schools with a high proportion of pupils from poor 
families. Schools specialising in languages, for example, experienced a 4.7 percentage 
point gain in exam performance, but this substantial gain was confined to schools with 
a high proportion of pupils from poor families (see Table 6). The exam performance 
gains in business studies (5.5 pp) and technology schools (4.2 pp) were also 
substantial for schools with a high proportion of pupils from poor families. The results 
provided in Table 6 indicate that the benefits of the specialist schools programme 
have been highly concentrated in favour of the less well off.  
  The estimated impact of the policy reforms obtained for schools with different 
proportions of pupils from poor families corresponds with the results obtained when 
schools are grouped according to the proportion of ethnic minority pupils. The impact 
of competitive forces and the EiC programme is substantially higher for schools with 
a high proportion of pupils from ethnic minorities (see Table 7). The EiC and 
specialist schools programmes, for example, had a substantially greater impact on the 
exam performance of schools with more than 50 per cent of pupils from ethnic 
minorities than on the exam performance of schools with less than 10 per cent from 
ethnic minorities.  
  The final distributional aspect of the benefits of the education reforms relates 
to gender differences in exam performance.15 Equation 3 is estimated for three 
different types of school according to their gender admissions policy: boys-only, girls-
only and co-educational schools (see Table 8). The most interesting, and perhaps most 
surprising, result is that single-sex schools benefited far more from the EiC 
programme than did co-educational schools, which was directed specifically at urban 
areas with the severest problems of deprivation. This programme is estimated to have 
                                                 
15 The factors underlying the evolution of the gender gap in exam results are investigated by Andrews 
et al. (2006), who argue that part of the explanation for the trend improvement in girls’ exam results 
relative to boys was the switch to an examination system based more heavily on coursework from the 
late 1980s. There is evidence that girls prefer coursework and this could account for the increase in the 
gender gap as well as an improvement in results overall (Machin and McNally, 2005). Other 
explanations of the widening gap include the increasingly poor attitude of boys to performing well in 
school.  boosted exam performance by 3.4 and 5.6 percentage points in boys-only and girls-
only schools respectively compared to only 1.7 percentage points in co-educational 
schools. This result is consistent with the earlier reported finding that schools with the 
highest ability pupils gained most from the EiC programme.16 Neither boys-only nor 
girls-only schools, however, are estimated to have benefited from the specialist 
schools programme. 
 
Spatial variations in the effect of the policy reforms 
We observed earlier that the gap in exam performance between non-metropolitan and 
metropolitan areas has closed substantially in recent years (see Figure 2). To what 
extent can this be explained by the education reforms? One reason for the greater 
impact in metropolitan areas could be the greater competition for pupils in 
metropolitan areas since there are more schools to choose from. Schools in 
metropolitan areas may therefore have to be more aggressive to attract pupils and 
urban transport links will help to facilitate this choice. We should consequently expect 
the impact of competition to be greater in metropolitan than in non-metropolitan 
areas. The results reported in Table 9 suggest that this is the case. A one percentage 
point increase in the exam performance of competing schools is associated with an 
improvement of 0.38 percentage points in metropolitan schools compared to only 0.12 
percentage points in non-metropolitan schools. There is also evidence that the 
specialist schools programme had a greater impact in metropolitan schools than in 
non-metropolitan schools.  
  Although the sharp decline in the performance gap between metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan schools is interesting and suggestive, a more fruitful approach to 
identifying the impact of choice and competition on exam performance is to 
investigate how the policy impact varies according to (a) the number of schools in a 
district and (b) the potential competition between schools within a district. A 
concentration ratio (i.e. the Herfindahl index) is used as an indicator of potential 
competitiveness in each school district.     
The effect of the extent of school choice on the strength of the policy effects is 
indicated in Table 10. The impact of competition on exam performance increases as 
the number of schools in a district increases, as expected, since competitive forces are 
                                                 
16 The percentage of pupils gaining five or more A*-C grades in the GCSE exams in 2006 was 75%, 
70% and 56% in girls-only, boys-only and co-educational schools respectively.   likely to be more intense in markets where there are more schools. The opposite result 
is obtained for the EiC programme, which is estimated to have been less effective in 
districts with a large number of schools. Its greater success in districts with a small 
number of schools is possibly because the EiC programme depends on cooperation 
between schools and that cooperation may be easier to achieve in districts with only a 
small number of schools.  
Finally, we investigate the extent to which the effect of competition varies 
according to the degree of concentration of pupils within schools in each district. The 
results in Table 11 indicate that the estimated coefficient on the competition variable 
falls as the degree of concentration increases, as expected. This confirms that 
competition between schools is likely to have a greater impact on exam performance 
in a more competitive environment, as measured in this case by the Herfindahl index. 
The converse result is obtained for the EiC programme, which is estimated to be most 
effective in districts with the lowest degree of concentration. We therefore conclude 
from the results in Tables 10 and 11 that competition works best where choice is 
greatest, and cooperation works best where there are fewer schools to coordinate in a 
partnership arrangement. 
 
V.         CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has investigated the impact on exam performance of three major education 
policies that have been introduced into England’s secondary schools during the past 
two decades. Following the Education Act (1988), a quasi-market was created in the 
early 1990s by providing schools with increasing control over their own resources and 
by linking each school’s funding more directly to its intake of pupils. On the other 
side of the equation, parental choice of school has been considerably increased. 
Moreover, schools were increasingly differentiated by the specialist schools 
programme, which began in 1994 with the designation of technology colleges. In 
addition to expanding the choice set to ten different specialisms (and more recently to 
a combination of any two specialisms), policy has become more heavily focused on 
schools in areas of severe deprivation through the Excellence in Cities programme.  
  This paper has attempted to estimate the effect of these three education 
policies on the exam performance of pupils at the end of compulsory education. Our 
main findings, which are based on a panel of all secondary schools in England (1992-2006), are as follows. First, the introduction of a quasi-market sought to increase 
competition between schools for pupils and, in so doing, improve their exam 
performance. Our estimates suggest, however, that only around 20% of the overall 
improvement in exam performance over the period 1992-2006 can be attributed 
specifically to the quasi-market reforms. This policy had a far bigger impact, 
however, in metropolitan areas where competition is likely to be more intense and 
where parental choice is likely to be greater. We estimate that the quasi-market 
accounted for over 35% of the overall improvement in exam results in metropolitan 
areas compared to around 10% of the improvement in non-metropolitan areas. This 
finding is supported by the further result that the impact of competition was found to 
be substantially greater in districts which had the most schools and in districts with 
the lowest concentration of pupils in just a few schools (as measured by the 
Herfindahl index).  
  Second, the impact of the specialist schools programme on exam performance 
is estimated to have been modest, improving exam performance by less than one 
percentage point overall. Some specialisms, however, had a bigger impact on exam 
performance than others, with the largest effects being for schools specialising in 
business and enterprise (2.3 percentage points) and in technology (1.6 percentage 
points). No discernible effect could be detected for the majority of specialist schools, 
suggesting that a large proportion of the funding yielded no significant improvement 
in exam performance. This suggests a substantial misallocation of public funds since 
the schools with the greatest proportion of pupils from poor families were least likely 
to acquire specialist status throughout the study period.  
Third, the Excellence in Cities programme is estimated to have had some 
success, insofar as it accounted for a 2 percentage point improvement in GCSE results 
during 2000-06 (when exam results improved by 11 percentage points overall). The 
overall effect on exam performance has been small, however, since it has been mainly 
restricted to schools in metropolitan areas. 
  Although the education reforms are estimated to have had only a small impact 
on exam performance in aggregate, there is convincing evidence that the impacts that 
did occur have been distributionally beneficial. Our estimates suggest that the 
increased competition had the greatest impact on exam performance in those schools 
with the most disadvantaged pupils. The same result was obtained for the specialist 
schools programme, which also had its biggest impact in schools with the most disadvantaged pupils. Specifically, these two policies benefited those schools with the 
highest proportion of pupils from poor families and with the highest proportion of 
ethnic minority pupils. The distributional effects of the EiC programme are less clear 
cut. There is evidence, for example, that those schools with the highest ability pupils 
gained more from this programme than schools with the lowest ability pupils. This 
was not the intention of the programme. All three policies, however, are estimated to 
have had a greater impact on schools with a high proportion of ethnic minority pupils.  
  The impact of the education reforms taken as a whole has therefore been 
relatively small, with only about one-third of the total improvement in exam 
performance being directly attributable to these three education reforms. This seems 
to be a rather meagre return on a substantial investment in education resources. One 
possible explanation for the gap between the impact of the policies and the overall 
change in exam results is simply that the GCSE exams have become easier or that 
assessment methods have become less stringent. In other words, there may have been 
grade inflation. There is still no convincing evidence, however, that grade inflation 
has been substantially responsible for the steady improvement in exam results since 
the early 1990s. We cannot rule out the possibility that the effects of the education 
reforms have not been accurately estimated by the methods used in this paper.   
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Review, vol. 16, pp. 431-441. Table 1  Mean characteristics of schools, 1992-2006 
 
























% of schools 
partners in EiC 
programme 
1992 35.5  15.3  19.2  819  17.1  0.168  0.0 0.0 
1993 37.8  15.7  18.7  846  17.2  0.161  0.0 0.0 
1994 39.9  15.8  19.4  868  18.5  0.163  1.2 0.0 
1995 40.7  15.9  19.2  892  19.1  0.158  2.5 0.0 
1996 42.1  16.2  19.7  901  19.4  0.150  4.6 0.0 
1997 42.5  16.3  16.8  912  19.5  0.153  6.8 0.0 
1998 43.8  16.5  20.0  922  18.8  0.157  9.5 0.0 
1999 45.7  16.6  19.4  942  18.1  0.158  11.9 0.0 
2000 47.0  17.0  15.1  968  17.5  0.156  15.7 13.5 
2001 48.3  17.0  17.4  989  16.9  0.148  20.4 23.1 
2002 49.9  16.9  17.8  1004  16.0  0.146  30.2 28.0 
2003 51.7  17.0  14.5  1022  15.6  0.145  45.0 28.1 
2004 52.9  17.0  16.5  1033  15.5  0.152  61.7 27.8 
2005 55.6  16.7  16.6  1032  15.3  0.143  74.3 28.1 
2006 58.3  16.6  16.6  1035  14.7  0.136  78.2 27.5 
Note: The Herfindahl index is the sum of (si - Si)
2, where s is the proportion of pupils 
obtaining five or more A*-C grades in each school and S is the corresponding proportion for 













Technology 1994  585  19 
Languages 1995  221  7 
Arts 1997  421  14 
Sport 1997  350  11 
Business 2002  229 7 
Engineering 2002  57  2 
Maths 2002  225  7 
Science 2002  303  10 
Humanities 2004  72  2 
Music 2004  27  1 
      
None     -  588  19 
      
Total     -  3078  100 
  
TABLE 3   Estimated fixed effects model  
 
Explanatory variables  Dependent variable = proportion of pupils 
obtaining five or more A*-C grades 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 




Excellence in Cities Partnership    0.021*** 
(0.001)   
Excellence in Cities: phase 1 (2000)      0.026*** 
(0.002) 
Excellence in Cities: phase 2 (2001)      0.017*** 
(0.002) 
Excellence in Cities: phase 3 (2002)      0.016*** 
(0.003) 
All specialisms    0.007*** 
(0.001)   
Arts     0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Business studies / enterprise     0.023*** 
(0.003) 
Engineering     -0.008 
(0.006) 
Languages     -0.005* 
(0.003) 
Maths     -0.001 
(0.003) 
Science     0.002 
(0.003) 




































Proportion of pupils eligible for free 




























































































      
R-squared (within)  0.42  0.45  0.45 
n 43447  43304  43304 
 
Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. TABLE 4   Estimated policy effects over the ability range 
 
Average exam score of school 











































Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% 












TABLE 5   Estimated policy effects by proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals 
 
Average % eligible for free school meals 












































Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% 










TABLE 6   Estimated policy effects by proportion of pupils eligible  
for free school meals and by type of specialism 
 
 
Explanatory variables  % eligible for free school meals 
(average 1992-2005) 
 


































































      
R-squared (within)  0.44  0.44  0.56 
n 8526  26019  8759 
Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% 
respectively. The estimated coefficients for year dummies are not reported. Schools 
specialising in engineering, humanities and music were excluded due to small number 





TABLE 7   Estimated policy effects by proportion of pupils in ethnic minority 
 
Average % of pupils in ethnic 






































Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. 
The estimated coefficients for the controls and year dummies are not reported.  TABLE 8   Estimated policy effects by gender of admissions 
 






























Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. 




TABLE 9   Estimated policy effects for schools in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Dependent variable = proportion of pupils obtaining five 
or more A*-C grades 
  Non-metropolitan Metropolitan 
















All specialisms  0.004*** 
(0.002)   
0.014*** 



































































        
R-squared (within)  0.41  0.41  0.53  0.53 
n 27404  27404  15140  15140 
Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% 
respectively. The estimated coefficients for the controls and year dummies are not 
reported.  











































Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% 
respectively. The estimated coefficients for the controls and year dummies are not 
reported. There is no estimated coefficient for the EiC Partnership programme for districts 







TABLE 11   Estimated policy effects by degree of concentration of pupils in schools within 
district 
 













































Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. The 
estimated coefficients for the controls and year dummies are not reported.  The Herfindahl 
index is the sum of (si - Si)
2, where s is the proportion of pupils obtaining five or more A*-





































1992  1993  1994 1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005  2006
Metropolitan
Non-metropolitan